commitment a more practical rendering in the field of criminal law by submitting the Proposal for a Council Framework Decision (CFD) on certain procedural rights in criminal proceedings throughout the European Union.
12 Ambitious as the Proposal was, it was ultimately abandoned in 2007 after years of political disagreement. 13 With the coming into force of the Lisbon
Reform Treaty in 2009 14 -which also means the Fundamental Rights Charter's provisions 5 Tampere Conclusion 30 (fn. 3) invited the Council to establish minimum standards ensuring an adequate level of legal aid in cross-border cases. Conclusion 31 refers to multilingual forms or documents to be used in crossborder court cases. Conclusions 33 and 35 respectively mention facilitation of the judicial protection of individual rights and that the principle of fair trial should not be prejudiced by fast track extradition procedures. Conclusion 40 points out that it seeks to develop measures against crime while protecting freedoms and legal rights of individuals. 6 Council of the European Union, Programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions in criminal matters, OJ 2001 L C12/10. The Programme indicates a number of parametersdetermining the effectiveness of mutual recognition -amongst which parameter 3 includes mechanisms for safeguarding the rights of (third parties, victims and) suspects and parameter 4 mentions the definition of common minimum standards necessary to facilitate the application of the principle of mutual recognition. Before delving into the Commission's reasoning for this two-way approach, the general concept of introducing minimum standards for a specific category of defendants is to be assessed in terms of competency and feasibility. As indicated below, the previous measures and their subsequent Directives sparked a debate on the EU's power to do so. Yet, where these measures have each targeted a specific type of procedural right -information, translation, access to legal advice, etc. -applicable to a general public of people involved in criminal proceedings, the initiatives flowing from the Roadmap's measure E aim to enable a set of rights to a specified category of individuals based on their vulnerability. In order to legitimately do so, the Union should be clear in identifying how these initiatives would fall within the scope of competence bestowed upon it by its Treaties.
II. 1. The Procedural Roadmap and competence issues
With the Lisbon Reform Treaty, the principle of mutual recognition was formally given a treaty basis in Article 82 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
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Simultaneously, Article 82(2) TFEU outlines the relation with minimum harmonisation of criminal procedural law. In its second paragraph, the article clearly states that (only) "to the extent necessary to facilitate mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters having a cross-border dimension, the person's age and that person's capacity to travel and cross borders seems fairly straightforward, it is, however, much more ambiguous to automatically assume the same for a mentally and/or physically impaired adult. The variety -and perceptibility -by which mental and/or physical features may restrict an adult in his capacity to travel unhindered (or unnoticed) make this a less evident exercise. As the current initiatives only promote a proposal for a binding Directive for children, the specific reasoning for such an instrument, as well as the basis for EU competence in this matter, need to be scrutinised against the backdrop of the cross-border threshold. In the impact assessment accompanying the proposed Directive 31 , the Commission has to admit that, in terms of cross-border cases, there is no precise information with regard to vulnerable persons arrested or prosecuted outside their own member state and that a 1% figure may be retained as representative of the cross-border cases concerning (all) vulnerable defendants. 32 As such, the impact assessment's figures do not seem to make a particularly strong case for necessary EU action regarding children in transboundary situations. 33 Both observations -the disconnection with a strict cross-border context in the first part of the definition of the Directive's subject and scope and the apparent limited practical use for an EU intervention in the area of European Arrest Warrants -raise the question as to which direction the EU is going with its procedural rights approach and which interpretation of Article 82(2) TFEU it upholds. The Commission's stance on this subject is clarified in the impact assessment, where it is said that the cross-border element is not (or no longer) the primary concern of the initiated proposal for the Directive. In a separate paragraph, aptly titled Does the EU have power to act?, it is stated that:
30 This is not a mere personal assumption, but was also identified by the interim report on the study for the impact assessment of a measure covering special safeguards. "This initiative will apply to all criminal proceedings irrespective of whether they present a cross-border element or not. The reason for this is that both the policy objectives as described below may only be met if minimum rules apply to all criminal proceedings. In order to improve mutual trust and thus judicial cooperation, judicial authorities need to be aware that sufficiently high standards apply across the board in the jurisdictions of other Member
States. If Member States were at liberty to apply lower standards to purely domestic proceedings, the requisite of mutual trust between judicial authorities could not be boosted." 34 Hence, the Commission seems to put its foot down in the ongoing debate on the necessary link with cross-border elements and mutual recognition of judicial decisions. With the cross-border element apparently no longer a prerequisite for the Union to intervene, the assessment document provides three patterns underpinning the EU's competence to act:
-First, the scope of Art 82(2) is applicable "not only to cross-border criminal proceedings, but also to domestic cases as a precise, ex ante categorisation of criminal proceedings as cross-border or domestic is impossible in relation to a significant number of cases."
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-Secondly, the citation above states that minimum standards are necessary on a domestic level in order to build up confidence and trust between judicial authorities in case of cross-border cooperation.
-Thirdly, an interesting point is made where the Commission states:
"As concerns the need to safeguard the fundamental rights of citizens, the enactment of minimum rules for cross-border proceedings only, far from addressing the problem, would create two different classes of defendants in criminal proceedings, one with more rights than the other; this distinction, made on the basis of the cross-border nature of the procedure, would lead to unreasonable differentiation and would eventually be detrimental to the protection of fundamental rights. The first two statements tend to follow the type of classic reasoning previously witnessed in the preceding Directives. 37 The first statement promotes the persuasion that it is better to be safe than sorry, and to prepare your domestic situation -i.e. justice system -up to an acceptable standard for when your criminal proceedings become of a cross-border nature. The second one follows a similar reasoning and aims to build up the trust necessary for smooth cross-border cooperation by working through a bottom-up method of inserting minimum standards on a domestic level, so that member states -when the time comes -will be able to be confident in each other's legal systems when issuing a cooperation measure. 38 Very similar to the reasoning at the time of construction of the previous Directives, the question remains as to how this should and will be appreciated given the indication above that very few suspects or offenders who are minors find themselves entangled in cross-border criminal proceedings.
The third statement, however, firmly moves away from the cross-border perspective and defends the more radical notion of more and better justice for all throughout the EU. 39 The rationale for this is that confining the procedural minimum rights within a strict cross-border context would create a discriminatory context where individuals involved in domestic criminal proceedings may or may not be worse off. Moreover, the Commission makes a case for the notion that, as long as member states are acting within the scope of application of EU law, the EU's fundamental rights -via the Charter -are applicable regardless of a domestic or cross-border context. On both accounts, these are controversial arguments. In the first statement, the Commission implies that it no longer suffices to accept the diversity of (and between) the member states' internal criminal justice systems because they result in a discriminatory situation in which an individual, depending on the legal system applicable to him and whether or not he falls under a cross-border situation (and hence possible EU competence), is able to rely on either more or fewer rights. This seems poles apart from the . 38 An in-depth debate on the merits of these claims would go beyond the scope of this article, but suffice it to say that the obviousness with which the EU links the introduction of procedural minimum standards to enhanced mutual trust and confidence is questioned. See, i.a.: Vermeulen(fn. 25). 39 As is rightfully pointed out by Vermeulen (fn. 25), the 2009 Procedural Roadmap already made clear that the ambition of the instrument moved beyond 'fixing' trust issues in a cross-border mutual recognition context by stating in Recital 10 that "efforts should be deployed to strengthen procedural guarantees and the respect of the rule of law in criminal proceedings, no matter where citizens decide to travel, study, work or live in the European Union." As such, Vermeulen argues that more and better justice for all throughout the EU is the "real bet". statement that the Charter's provisions apply in both a domestic and cross-border context is viable. Before this can be the case, however, it has to be established that an EU legal act calls for national implementing measures and thus that the Union had the material competence to exercise and submit such a measure. 44 As such, for the Commission, the sting is in the tail: on the one hand the delineated threshold for, and poor evidence of, cross-border situations involving vulnerable defendants puts pressure on the necessity (and therefore competency) to act under an Article 82(2) mandate. On the other hand, and more importantly, the Commission itself has made it clear that it wishes to apply a different rationale for introducing minimum standards for minors as vulnerable defendants, aberrant of Article 82's provisions.
As such, the Commission wishes to derive a competency beyond the Treaty-based scope of 
III. A brief look at the Commission Recommendation
In order to fully grasp the Commission's progress in its quest for procedural safeguards for vulnerable persons suspected or accused in criminal proceedings, the Recommendation 46 requires some brief assessment. In general, the instrument seems innovative in that it specifically aims at a presumption of vulnerability and the identification of such vulnerability in persons involved in criminal proceedings.
First and foremost, the Commission recommends member states to foresee a presumption of vulnerability for certain persons in their legal systems, as will be indicated in the chapters below; this presumption particularly focuses on vulnerability as a result of mental disorders and to a lesser extent physical impairments. 47 Furthermore, it promotes the prompt and qualitative identification and recognition of such persons by ensuring that all competent authorities may have recourse to a medical examination by an independent expert, and that police officers, law enforcement and judicial authorities competent in criminal proceedings, should receive specific training to adequately deal with vulnerable persons. 48 Apart from these novel suggestions, recommendations are made to ensure the right to medical assistance and the audio-visual recording of questionings. 49 An intriguing aspect is that the Recommendation 
IV. Establishing vulnerability through diversity and demonstrated needs. A plea for an adequate approach towards mentally disordered defendants
Notwithstanding the critical observations above, the core of the initiatives -creating special safeguards for vulnerable defendants as a specific category of people involved in criminal proceedings in need of extra attention and defence opportunities -serves a noble goal. Apart from the discussion on the EU's ambiguous competency tactics, however, the policy choices made with respect to this goal need assessment. In the previous chapter, the Commission's Recommendation was evaluated on its flaws and merits, the biggest obstacle remaining its essentially non-binding character. The following paragraphs assess the Commission's rationale -based on three propositions -for its policy choices and make a case for an effective and adequate instrument for mentally disordered defendants. From a competency and policy perspective, such an instrument seems both feasible and imperative.
IV. 1. Vulnerability is in the eye of the beholder. Under identification of mental impairments in criminal proceedings
Measure E aims to show special attention to suspected or accused persons who, due to age, mental or physical conditions, cannot understand or follow the content or the meaning of the proceedings. 53 As such, the measure comprises a broad spectrum of possibly vulnerable defendants. The presented instruments, however, make a distinction from the start by delineating said vulnerability along the line of the age of the person involved. Up to a certain age limit, it is presumed (and for good measure: rightfully so) that every minor suspect or offender -with or without an additional mental or physical condition -presents a specific chance for vulnerability. Once this limit is reached, the specific mental or physical condition(s) from which a(n) (adult) person involved in criminal proceedings suffers need to be identified and assessed in order to establish this individual's vulnerability. Both evaluations, while undoubtedly influencing an individual's capacity to understand and participate in the proceedings, are based on considerably different grounds and hence require a diversified approach. When assessing an individual as vulnerable as identified by measure E in a strictly domestic context, the starting point will always be the screening and detection of said vulnerability once the individual has been apprehended. Hence, an immediate discrepancy becomes clear. Where a person's age consists of an objectified constatation 54 and, similarly, a diminished capacity to equivalently participate in the proceedings due to a physical condition could be considered as being sufficiently objectionable 55 , the determination of a diminished capacity based on a mental condition still forms a contentious undertaking. 56 To a large extent less distinct upon first sight and subsequently more complex to evaluate in terms of capacity and vulnerability, establishing the mental condition of a person involved in criminal 53 Council of the European Union (fn. 18), p. 3, Measure E. 54 E.g. Date of birth retrieved from birth certificate, passport, etc. 55 E.g. Accessibility of the places where the proceedings take place, availability of adequately adapted accommodation during the proceedings, etc. 56 In Annex II (Overview of stakeholder views on key elements of the proposed measures) of the impact assessment -European Commission (fn. 34) -accompanying the proposed Directive for special safeguards for children, the European Criminal Bar Association indicates the same conviction in its considerations where it is stated in para. 10 that "It is very difficult to define "vulnerable" except in relation to Children and Minors who may be identified by their age."
proceedings-and acting accordingly -constitutes an exceptionally sensitive and complex exercise. Without compromising the vulnerability of suspects or offenders of minor age or with a physical impediment and by no means disclaiming their need for specific safeguards, it remains the case that the very starting point for establishing vulnerability remains much more problematic for (adult) defendants with a mental disorder. For one, various EU-wide studies have indicated the existing diversity, but also the substandard level, of the screening and detection mechanisms available in the member states' legal systems. 57 Hence, from the starting point of an adequate establishment of vulnerability, an individual involved in criminal proceedings while subjected to a mental disorder, may be deemed as being in a disadvantageous position.
This lack of identification of adults with a mental disorder has a potentially grave impact on the data of vulnerable defendants in cross-border criminal proceedings. The scarcity of information 58 on detected vulnerability due to a mental impairment combined with substandard screening methods and a general lack of identification imply, at least, the possibility of a much higher number of mentally vulnerable persons involved in cross-border proceedings that slip through the net. The observation that "overall, the shortage of evidence in the field of psychiatric prevalence and mental health care in prisons is nothing less than dramatic" and that "even the most rudimentary health reporting standards for mental health care in prisons are lacking almost everywhere in Europe" 59 opens the door to gross neglect of mentally-oriented vulnerability both in domestic and cross-border context and both for juvenile and adult defendants. From a policy point of view, this necessitates prompt and adequate EU action in order to guarantee effective procedural safeguards. 60 Moreover, 57 There are no recent EU-wide results available on how (early) screening procedures in the pre-trial and trial phase are implemented across Europe, but the results of recent EU-wide studies indicating that qualitative screenings for mental disorders within European prisons do not take place in a consistent manner are an alarming indication. See, i. inexcusable omission to leave -in particular -mentally impaired defendants without a legitimate and effective instrument simply due to the practical consideration that it would be an arduous task to do so.
IV. 3. The need for an integrated approach
A final observation regarding the Commission's delineated approach between children and the 'bulk' of other vulnerable individuals, is that physical or mental impairment -unlike the distinction between a minor and adult defendant -is unrestricted by age. By creating a powerful instrument-to-be with the proposed Directive for minors while neglecting to do so on a general basis for all possible types of vulnerability, the Commission undermines the efficacy of the Roadmap's goal to create procedural safeguards for all vulnerable defendants, but also the proposed Directive itself. Once more with reference to the difficulty of detecting a -prevalent -mental illness, attributing vulnerability solely on an age criterion would forego same token, a relatively convenient establishment of a person's -be it of minor or adult agevulnerability due to physical incapacity could be made complex by coexistent mental illness.
Hence, an integrated approach imposes itself in order to guarantee that all fronts are covered in guaranteeing necessary safeguards for the vulnerable population in criminal proceedings.
The Commission's Recommendation, unrestricted by the age criterion of the proposed Directive, is satisfactory in this perspective, but ultimately remains a mere suggestive, nonbinding entity. An effective instrument is imperative to ensure an integrated approach towards vulnerability.
V. Conclusion
With the two new initiatives stemming from the Roadmap's measure E, the Commission embarks on a noble mission of enhancing the protection for a category of defendants in criminal proceedings that are specifically vulnerable due to age, mental or physical conditions.
Rightfully aiming at providing better procedural safeguards, the Commission's policy choices and underlying rationale indicate a number of flaws with the potential to jeopardise the entirety of the set out goals. In the first place, the Commission risks overplaying its hand by flexibly interpreting Treaty and Charter-based provisions in order to establish a newfound type of -possibly overstretched -competence. Proposing legally binding legislation consisting of a set of procedural rights for an age-related category of persons less likely to be involved in cross-border criminal proceedings while justifying this approach through a newfound competence severed from the basis provided in the TFEU might just be the proverbial bridge too far for the member states. On the one hand, pushing the envelope competency-wise, the Commission in contrast seems terribly prudent when delineating its tactics to combat vulnerability in all its (other) aspects. Full attention is dedicated to children as vulnerable defendants due to the consideration that a widespread consensus already exists on their vulnerability, definitions and handling. there is a dire need to create additional safeguards as regards screening, detection and identification for both adults and children impaired by a mental condition as they tend to be less obviously visible and risk slipping through the net. By the same token, the problematic screening and detection -and as such, lack of identification -of mentally disordered adults in combination with a more probable cross-border mobility would imply that the creation of a binding instrument would be more in accordance with the terms of competency embedded in Article 82(2) TFEU.
